The Libya intervention has already turned the international
kaleidoscope, showing new and remarkable patterns. It has seen China acquiesce to a no-fly zone, and the West in alliance with the Arab League. Nobody thought that was likely 6 months ago. It has
also changed reputations. Nicolas Sarkozy may win re-election on the back of the war. William Hague, who had a bad revolution, is having a good war.
The government has become more multilateralist, as opposed to the kind of bilateralism it espoused when it took office. Nearly a year ago, it sent a clear message to the FCO — bilateral ties
would matter, multilateral ties less so. Now, however, the FCO is working full-time to “multilateralise” the intervention, gaining legal backing from the UN and organisational support
from NATO.
NATO’s announcement has not led to a new German foreign policy; rather it has confirmed the country’s exports-first, election-focused, free-rider outlook. For Spain, however, the intervention has
led to a considerable change in policy.
As my colleague, Jose Ignacio Torreblanca notes, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero could have chosen to concentrate on the Euro crisis and the forthcoming regional and municipal elections. “If you are a progressive politician in Spain, bombing the Middle East with
the aid of the US is not something you would want to do when you are twenty points below the Conservatives in the polls ahead of an imminent election.” But he did not, and neither did Belgium.
This is not a Suez War coalition: it is much broader.
Finally, the Libya intervention has also killed the EU’s aspirations to become an independent security actor. As The Economist’s Charlemagne columnist writes:
A more formal and broader EU form of defence cooperation is dead, at least for now.“The use of military force will remain a matter largely for those willing and able to exert it. That means Britain and France will continue to dictate the terms of European military engagement.”
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