Does Japan want its own nuclear weapons?

Japan is planning to strengthen its ‘counterstrike capabilities’ by deploying long-range missiles on the southern island of Kyushu. The missiles have a range of 621 miles, meaning they could hit targets within North Korea and China. The move comes amidst rising tensions in the region and in an atmosphere of increased uncertainty in Japan about American security guarantees.

The weapons, upgraded versions of the GSDF (Ground Self Defense Force – Japan’s army) Type 12 land-to-ship guided missiles, will be stored at bases with existing military garrisons and will be able to defend the strategically vital Okinawa island chain. Placing the missiles on Okinawa itself, which reaches to within 68 miles of Taiwan, and which already has shorter-range missiles, appears to have been deemed too provocative. 

Japan has been a staunch defender of the anti-nuclear movement since the second world war

It is hard to know when exactly this plan was formulated. But it is hard not to see it as a reaction to President Trump’s comments on 6 March that the US-Japan Security Treaty, first signed in 1951, was ‘non-reciprocal’ and his implication that Japan needed to do much more in securing its own defence. The plan can be interpreted as Japan signalling a readiness to take far more responsibility – presumably in the hope that Trump will back off. It may even have been the Americans’ idea, or at the very least their strong suggestion.

If so, the swiftness of Japan’s response highlights the seriousness of the situation. With North Korea involving itself in the Ukraine war and continually behaving in a threatening and belligerent manner, and with China showing no signs of dialling down its own rhetoric on its claims for Taiwan, the last thing the Japanese government wants is doubts to arise about the viability of its security guarantees from the US.

In truth though, many in Japan have long questioned the wisdom of relying so heavily on the US. As such, Trump’s equivocation about the security relationship between the two countries may simply have served as an accelerant. Japan’s pacifist constitution imposed by the US at the end of the second world war severely restricts Japan’s ability to assert itself militarily. It will soon be 78 years since this document came into effect and many, not just on the so-called ‘far-right’, are questioning its continuing relevance.

Faced with the dread fear of China gaining control of Taiwan, and thus power over Japan’s Sea Lines of Communication, energy imports and control of the semi-conductor industry, there has been a steadily building consensus that Japan needs to do much more. The relatively moderate then prime minister Fumio Kishida announced a dramatic hike in military spending in 2023 (though there were serious doubts about how his cash-strapped administration would be able to pay for it).

Current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is on record as advocating for an Asian version of Nato to pool defence responsibilities in the region against the threats of North Korea, Russia and China. The idea didn’t get off the drawing board, but that it was floated at all is an indicator of the direction of thought in government circles.

Then there is the elephant in the room: the nuclear option. Last October, Newsweek published an article speculating on the significance of remarks Ishiba had made at the Hudson Institute, where he proposed ‘America’s sharing of nuclear weapons or the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region’. Ishiba was not yet president of his party at the time and it may have been a faint to impress his party’s right wing, but it could also be that he was heavily hinting Japan needed its own home-made nuclear deterrent.

Ishiba hasn’t said much about this since, perhaps mindful that people are not ready to contemplate such a drastic step yet. The selection of the Nihon Hidankyo (an organisation representing survivors of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaski) as Nobel laureates last year, and perhaps to a lesser extent the much-delayed release of Christopher Nolan’s Oppenheimer served to reinforce Japan’s deeply ingrained anti-nuclear stance.

Ishiba’s views may be too much for the Japanese at present. But with the Pentagon forecasting that China will quadruple its nuclear stockpile by 2035 and with Kim Jong Un of North Korea stating last September that he intends to increase his nation’s nuclear arsenal ‘exponentially,’ they don’t seem quite so unreasonable. In South Korea, which still has military service for males, it seems people are already convinced: a Gallup poll from last February revealed 73 per cent were in favour of their country possessing nukes.

As far as we can tell, the Japanese public is not near that. Japan has been a staunch defender of the anti-nuclear movement since the second world war. Meanwhile, polling from 2019 indicated a 75 per cent majority in favour of Japan signing the TPNW (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons) which, if it happened, would further undermine its security relationship with America. However, a more recent and detailed study by Taylor and Francis suggested that this support may be eroding.

Placing long-range missiles in Kyushu – with no significant public outcry – reinforces this impression and hints that the public mood in Japan may be shifting. If tensions continue to heighten, and Trump remains unmoved, it might be time for a new poll.