Sam Ashworth-Hayes Sam Ashworth-Hayes

In defence of mutually assured destruction

The horrific calculus has kept us as safe as we can be in a nuclear age

(Getty)

Already a subscriber? Log in

This article is for subscribers only

Subscribe today to get 3 months' delivery of the magazine, as well as online and app access, for only £3.

  • Weekly delivery of the magazine
  • Unlimited access to our website and app
  • Enjoy Spectator newsletters and podcasts
  • Explore our online archive, going back to 1828

Mutually assured destruction works because both sides believe that the use of nuclear weapons on their part would be met in kind, with any conflict entering an irreversible escalation. Because the rational response to a nuclear launch is a nuclear launch, there is no incentive to engage in one. And because conventional conflict raises the risk of nuclear war if the parties are unbalanced, there is a strong incentive to avoid that too.

In other words, so long as both of our men are sitting with their weapons drawn and loaded, neither wants to fire. Putin himself has observed that nuclear war ‘would be a global disaster for humanity’ and a thing to avoid, but that if provoked ‘I must ask myself: why would we want a world without Russia?’.

Rather than signalling imminent conflict, Putin’s rhetoric is a reminder that we should be aware of this balance. Those concerned about his sabre-rattling can find some comfort in the Russian statement on its nuclear doctrine, which lists the circumstances under which the state would consider using its nuclear weapons: the launch of ballistic missiles targeting Russia, the use of weapons of mass destruction within its territory, conventional forces threatening the existence of the Russian state, or an attempt to ‘decapitate’ Russia’s nuclear forces.

Of course, a degree of ambiguity over when and why these weapons would be used gives the threat of their deployment greater weight, and the existence of a doctrine hasn’t stopped speculation over other circumstances when they might see use. Some analysts – and the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review – have speculated that Russia could use a strategy of ‘escalate-to-de-escalate’, deploying nuclear weapons or their threat to cement battlefield advantage or terminate a conflict. This is not contained within the Russian strategy document, although suspicious readers could find things to dislike in the phrase ‘preventing the escalation of hostilities and their termination on terms acceptable’.

It is the existence of this ambiguity, though, and a desire to avoid accidental escalation that has led Nato to firmly commit to avoiding direct conflict with Russia in Ukraine. And for all the talk, neither Russia nor America has put its forces on standby for imminent use. America has more command and control aircraft making flights, ensuring that its command chains would survive an attempt at a pre-emptive strike. Russia is making sure that its facilities are staffed.

The logic of mutually assured destruction can be counter-intuitive, but in some circumstances these actions can serve to make conflict less likely. The greatest point of danger is when one side believes it can ‘win’ a nuclear exchange – through missile defence systems, pre-emptive strikes, or other measures – destabilising the delicate equilibrium. Measures that reduce that temptation help keep things predictable.

None of this is to say you should be particularly delighted about peace being maintained by the threat of nuclear Armageddon. If nothing else, the United States refuses to adopt a ‘no first use’ stance, and the Russians have a policy that could see them sending warheads over in response to faulty equipment telling Moscow the Americans have started a war. Mutually assured destruction may have had its successes, but it has also had a string of near misses.

For all the rhetoric, nobody wants an accidental exchange of nuclear weapons. It would be by far the most embarrassing way for a sentient species to go extinct. Nato and Russia have taken sensible steps during this war to avoid the risk of escalation, keeping forces away from a hair-trigger stance, maintaining lines for urgent communication, and postponing missile tests.

That Putin might use nuclear weapons in extremis is less relevant than the fact that this uncertainty means we should never find directly confrunt Russia. As he himself has said: ‘it would probably mean the end of our civilization’.

Comments

Join the debate for just $5 for 3 months

Be part of the conversation with other Spectator readers by getting your first three months for $5.

Already a subscriber? Log in